Wednesday, September 29, 2004

Ideology and Social Capability: an enquiry on Public Virtues generating mechanisms

Why are some governments successful in implementing their policies while some others systematically fail? What determines the relationship between citizens and the State? Are citizens more willing to cooperate in an efficient institutional system?

The social capability defined as ''the ability to pursue efficiently the collective action'', is a key-concept to investigate the mechanisms that generate a successful institutional context. The related concept of social capital comes from the idea of measuring the individual propensity to cooperate. Citizens' cooperation avoid the sub-optimal effects of non-cooperative behaviors, as the ones classically illustrated in the Prisoner's Dilemma class of games. The literature has hypothesized that a direct relationship exists between the social capital present in a society and the capability of its institutional system.

The literature on Political Business Cycle has analyzed until now, empirically and theoretically, aspects of economic policy such as public expenditure, monetary policy, taxation and public debt. Here we present a version of partisan theory based on social capability.

If during the '70s the ideological trade-off between the Left and the Right, in accordance with the inflation-unemployment theories was acceptable, cum gran salis, the evolution of the political debate in the last twenty years has made this hypothesis progressively less satisfactory. The ''liberalization'' and ''deregulation'' wave of the beginning of the eighties, and the decline of planned economies, have moved the political focus to totally different issues and styles. The goals, the programs and the strategies of the main political parties in the western countries have been significantly modified[1]. During the most recent electoral campaign in the U.K. it has been noted that Labour's electoral manifesto presented many points which had originally been proposed by Mrs Thatcher Tory cabinet in 1978. The associations made with blue collars-''Left'', ''Right''-white collars, is not so straightforward. It is difficult to justify why ''Left'' parties should support inflationary policies which affect the middle classes that are becoming progressively a relevant part of their electoral power.
If we analyze the ''Left''-''Right'' dimension by relying on the relationship between the level of social capability and the role of the State, we are able to overcome this impasse generated by the historical change process. We will probably obtain a much more general analysis tool which will improve our comprehension of the phenomena studied.
We will adopt a conceptual scheme, while the ''Left'' parties on the other hand tend to overestimate the level of social capital. As a consequence, in countries where ''Right'' parties are incumbents the role of the State is under-efficient while the opposite happens when ''Left'' parties are governing. based on the ideas illustrated when speaking of the relationship between performance, structure and governance.We propose a classification of political actors based on the matching rule proposed by the World Bank in its 1997 annual report. We will differentiate ideology on the basis of the rejection or the acceptance of this principle. For those politicians who adopt a political philosophy in the idealistic tradition, is totally erroneous to select the goals of collective actions on the basis of the status quo of the environment.

According to a growing literature, to solve collective actions dilemmas, the State, as Hobbes's Leviathan, has to explicitly take into account social capability constraints when forming economic policy decisions. By adopting such a perspective, the empirical observation that governments had sometimes provided welfare enhancing institutions, but had also provided institutions that led to economic decline, can be analyzed by relying on the matching capability-role of the State framework. If we introduce the presence of a democratic system in the analysis, the existence of an ideological cycle in the level of social capital formation emerges. To create a successful institutional system it is therefore necessary to consider the unbiased management of the State and civic cooperation's common nature of public goods.
We showed that political preferences concerning the role of the State and the level of social capital may bias the composition of public expenditure, thus leading to different capability settings. A quick empirical testing on 12 western countries seems to provide evidence confirming these theoretical predictions.
In this paper we have deliberately not investigated the informal mechanisms that can generate social capital. We focused our analysis only on the active role of the State to empower the capability creation process. We don't believe that such informal channels are not important. On the contrary, we attribute great importance to self-generated public virtues enhancing mechanisms. We simply tried to study the role of the State as a constraint and a source of social capital. It is therefore important to add a caveat to the previous conclusions: obviously our work should be evaluated bearing in mind that the level of social capital is not only function of the policy makers' choices, but depends also on a wider set of elements (social networks, ''informal norms'', etc.).

Monday, September 27, 2004

Partisan and “Opportunistic” Behaviour: A Restatement of Alesina’s Model with endogenous voting and ideological-opportunistic policy makers

In this paper we would like to discuss a simple version of a famous Alesina’s model in order to give a more “realistic” description of the voting mechanism (on the demand side of political-economical market) and to move towards an integrated perspective between political-business cycle and partisan theory (on the supply side).
By endogenizing the process used by electors to select their ballots behaviours, is a goal of great importance in our vision. We would like to stress in this way the importance of individual choice, so turning the accent on microfoundations of Political Economy. These kinds of topics were in the centre of the early scholars analysis, and had a great role in first generation models on economic-electoral cycle, but the second wave of works on these issues considered this type of relations as exogenous facts.
Studies on voting functions, show us as electoral results could be put under a unique model of analysis with reaction functions of political parties. Following this line, which see politics and economics as integrated systems both on demand and supply side we moved towards the endogenization of electoral probability for each party to an element endogenously determined.
Moreover our work tries to reconcile partisan theory and opportunistic view of political business cycle, choosing a research line partially different from Zurich school’s one which shows the appearance of opportunistic behavior, as a phenomenon strictly connected with electoral deficit situation for political actors (More clearly, we are speaking of popularity of the government below a certain critic grade). Moving away from this kind of model we have preferred to assume that politicians work on the base of ideological and opportunistic forces in each part of the game considered. It seem us really hard to think at a complete scission between this two causes, because it would tend to serious shocks in current policy making choices surely less efficient than a coordinated programmatic line.

Redistribution effects of pension systems – empirical literature

In the last decade, many governments have made reforms to their retirement income systems that have sought to reduce the generosity of public pensions in order to keep fiscal sustainability and to encourage a greater reliance on multi-pillar systems, as originally recommended by World Bank in a seminal study (1994).
Given the strong emphasis on fiscal imperatives, poverty and social considerations have been much less central in the policy debate both when the reforms occurred and later when their impacts have been assessed. More generally, we can say that the state of the art of analyzing redistribution impacts of pension systems is still at a seminal stage. We will try to explain in this paper some of the reasons causing this phenomenon.This paper aims at surveying the literature, which examine the relationship between pension systems and income inequality. We will look at studies focused on developed as well developing countries.

Thursday, September 02, 2004

An experimental approach to the study of Banking: the BankNet Simulator

Abstract

The implementation of a simulator like BankNet allows to show the full potential of experiments with artificial agents in the study of economic problems.In the model the existence of banking intermediation is displayed in presence of bounded rationality, highly imperfect information and high transaction costs. The non coordinated agents choose on the basis of simple rules of thumb and unintentionally create institutions useful to reduce the complexity of the environment. The perspective is dynamic, and the adjustment processes are in great evidence. This aspect is more effective than in the traditional analytical models of differential equations employed in orthodox dynamic analysis. The continuing interaction among the agents is the evolutive engine which, “from the bottom-up” makes it possible for the system to evolve over time through a selecting mechanism.

"An experimental approach to the study of Banking: The BankNet Simulator” in “Economic Simulation with Swarm” edited by Francesco Luna and Benedikt Stefansson, Kluwer Academic Press, 2000

http://web.tiscali.it/msapienza/acepaper.htm

Il federalismo possibile nel settore dell'energia

Search in artificial labour markets: a simulation study

Abstract

Job search theory involves perfectly rational, maximising actors which make decisions under imperfect information. In the paper we simulate a labour market which works differently: heterogeneous firms and workers interact following rules that place only bounded demands on their computational capacities. We model an adaptive sequential search process in which workers canvass firms. Contrarily to traditional search models, the worker reservation wage is not the optimal one, but it is determined according to individual features such as wealth and skills. Similarly to the simplest search models, search costs are constant and expressed by unit of search. As for firms, we assume that enterprises which require a more educated labour force are willing to pay higher wages and that more skilled workers have higher reservation wage. This allows us to analyse jointly the process of search and the possibility of skill mismatch phenomena. We analyse departures from traditional GE models by means of two versions of the model. In the first one, agents have infinite life, whereas, in the second one, there are demographic and aging processes which affect internal states and decision making of agents. In both versions, we devise various educational and training policies to assess the effect training and formal education on the labour market setting. We stress the relevance of heterogeneity, demography, formal education, and training on the job in determining employment, activity rate, wage, and skill mismatch phenomena by comparing the ACE model with a more traditional general equilibrium model. Results are interesting from both the theoretical and the empirical point of view.

No 175, Computing in Economics and Finance 2000 from Society for Computational Economics
http://econpapers.hhs.se/paper/scescecf0/175.htm

http://web.tiscali.it/msapienza/acepaper.htm

Do Real Options perform better than Net Present Value? Testing in an artificial financial market

Abstract
This paper contains an investigation on a particular kind of non-linear rational expectations equilibrium in financial markets. By adopting an agent based computational finance (ACF) paradigm we will analyze whether using real options theory in financial markets is useful. Do agents who incorporate option value -when forming their trading prices - obtain higher profits? Real Options based valuation can be a valuable tool when the agents interacting in the market are homogenous in their cognitive abilities to understand and learn market dynamics, even if they are heterogenous in their ideas or ''market theories''. Speed of the learning process is another factor which crucially determines the relevance of an options based approach to valuation. If we introduce a small portion of traders acting on the basis of different strategies, we observe drastic deviations from the rational benchmark. Moreover the profitability of ROV based traders is inferior to random guessing, and to neural network based strategies.
Keywords: Agent Based Models; Artificial Markets; Classifier Systems; Economic Simulation; Market Microstructure; SWA
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation vol. 6, no. <http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/6/3/4.html>

Agent based computational finance -literature up to 2002

Again directly from my Ph.D. disseration a survey of Agent-based paradigm as well as a detailed discussion of agent-based finance (updated to 2002)

Real Options -a survey

Directly from my Ph.D Dissertation a summary of Real Options valution techniques (continous and discrete modelling).